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CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND REsPONSIBILITY. Ed-
ited by Warren J. Samuels and Arthur S. Miller. New York: Green-
. wood Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 328. $45. 
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the 
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which for-
bids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion 
that it does. 1 · 
Upon the bicentennial of the United States Constitution, it seems 
fitting to examine the import of Santa Clara, a terse but momentous 
Supreme Court decision. In Corporations and Society: Power and Re-
sponsibility, Warren J. Samuels2 and Arthur S. Miller3 undertake this 
task. The book traces the history of corporate personhood from the 
Santa Clara decision through the modern age of corporate giantism, 
and offers new perspectives on the social and political implications of 
corporate power. It provides a timely review of the role of the corpora-
tion in constitutional law and should inspire dialogue on important 
legal issues. 
Corporations and Society, a collection of essays, is divided into four 
parts. Part 1 focuses on the doctrinal origins and development of the 
1. Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (Chief Justice Waite for a 
unanimous court). 
2. Warren J. Samuels, Professor of Economics at Michigan State University, is the author of 
THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF EcONOMIC POLICY (1966), and the editor of THE CHICAGO 
SCHOOL OF POLITICAL EcoNOMY (1976) and of the annual, RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY. 
3. Arthur S. Miller, Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law, George Washington Univer-
sity, is the author of THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1968); THE MODERN 
CORPORATE STATE: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1976); and 
POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1985). 
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corporate theory in which Santa Clara figured prominently. Next, the 
book examines the use of the legal language of corporate personhood 
as a mechanism for social control and economic planning. In part 3, 
several authors consider the policy implications of corporate per-
sonhood and explore the consequences of the exercise of corporate 
power. Finally, part 4, which characterizes the corporation as an in-
stitution of private governance and social control, offers specific policy 
suggestions aimed at the democratization of the corporation. 
The book's examination of Santa Clara properly begins with an 
analysis of the doctrinal history of corporate personhood. First, Mor-
ton J. Horwitz explores competing corporate theories rooted in nine-
teenth century thought and considers their influence on the Santa 
Clara court.4 Horwitz traces the evolution of legal thought from the 
grant theory to the natural entity theory, a theory which has often 
been associated with the Santa Clara decision. Horwitz argues that 
while the natural entity theory served to legitimate emerging large-
scale enterprise, it did not fuel the decision in Santa Clara. 5 The treat-
ment of doctrinal history is furthered by Martin J. Sklar, who argues 
that the constructs of corporate personhood and limited liability, as 
well as the accommodation of corporate organization by state law, cre-
ated a legal environment conducive to corporate growth (p. 66). Sklar 
devotes particular attention to developments in antitrust law and con-
cludes that antitrust jurisprudence, which eventually adopted a rule of 
reason standard, also represented an adaptation to corporate 
capitalism. 6 
The articles which comprise part 2 examine the role of legal lan-
guage in defining social and economic reality. John J. Flynn's essay on 
the use and misuse of the corporate personhood concept provides an 
illustration of this theme. 7 Flynn assails the holding in Santa Clara as 
a "serious misuse of concepts for legal purposes" (p. 133). He criti-
cizes the Court for failing to reveal its reasoning (p. 133) and for 
neglecting to consider the consequences of its decision to extend con-
stitutional protection to the corporate entity (p. 139). Flynn contends 
4. The theories examined include the grant theory, the aggregate theory, and the natural 
entity theory. Under the grant theory, the corporation is regarded as an artificial being, created 
by the state and limited by its charter of incorporation. The aggregate theory rests on the notion 
that the corporation derives its power from the shareholders and emphasizes the property rights 
of shareholders. Finally, the natural entity theory personifies the corporation, treating it as an 
individual, rather than a mere aggregation of shareholders. Pp. 20-21. 
5. Horwitz contends that the natural entity theory was just being formulated at the time 
Santa Clara was decided. Instead, he argues, the Justices more likely proceeded from an aggre-
gate vision of the corporation, motivated by a desire to protect the property rights of the share-
holders. P. 23. 
6. Sklar reasons that the court ultimately construed the Sherman Act as embodying the com-
mon law in order to provide more certainty and predictability, thereby facilitating corporate 
growth and reorganization. Pp. 74-75. 
7. For an informative discussion of the language of corporate personhood, see Schane, The 
Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 562 (1987). 
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that the Santa Clara court's positivist application of the corporate per-
sonhood concept gave rise to a legacy of judicial manipulation. He 
argues that the Court, in the wake of Santa Clara, repeatedly used the 
concept of corporate personhood as a vehicle to impose its economic 
views. 8 Flynn concludes that the formulation of coherent legal stan-
dards to regulate corporations will not be feasible until the misuse of 
the concept of corporate personhood is rectified. 
The third part of Corporations and Society focuses on the policy 
consequences resulting from the use of the corporate personhood con-
cept. First, David Dale Martin explores the legal/constitutional 
asymmetries inherent in the personhood concept. He focuses on what 
he perceives to be double standards in antitrust law; noting, for exam-
ple, that while the personhood concept extends protection to the cor-
poration, it provides no protection to individuals from the 
corporation's power. Next, Walter Adams and James W. Brock, in a 
collaborative effort, consider the implications of this imbalance of 
power. They provide an insightful analysis of the effects of corporate 
giantism on society. After examining the social consequences of the 
American auto industry's exercise of corporate power, the authors 
conclude that the power of the corporate giants extends far beyond the 
capacity to influence price. They argue that implicit in the concentra-
tion of big business is the power to "exert inordinate influence" on 
social planning and allocation of resources (p. 232). Because such 
power remains unchecked, the authors recommend closer scrutiny and 
increased regulation of big business. 
The final part of Corporations and Society begins with Arthur S. 
Miller's examination of the so-called "secret constitution."9 He recog-
nizes the political and economic power exercised by the corporation to 
influence governmental policymaking in furtherance of its private in-
terests, and argues that, in fact, the corporation operates as an institu-
tion of private governance. While state and federal governments must 
operate within the confines of the Constitution, the system of private 
governance remains unchecked. Miller notes the asymmetry between 
corporate rights and corporate duties as evidence of the need to con-
trol and democratize the corporation (pp. 257-59). He is critical of the 
public/private dichotomy which pervades constitutional law and fa-
vors a policy which would impose upon the corporation concomitant 
constitutional duties. 10 
8. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574 (1949) (where the Court 
"assumed without discussion that the protections of the fourteenth amendment are available to a 
corporation" in striking down a state tax which discriminated against foreign corporations); Bell 
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (where the decision implicitly involved the fourteenth amend-
ment rights of a corporate person). 
9. The "secret constitution" refers to the system of private 'governments' comprised of pow-
erful corporations. P. 242. 
10. See pp. 256-57. Accord, Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity- Protec-
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The imbalance between rights and duties is further addressed by 
Martin Benjamin and Daniel A. Bronstein in their analysis of the 
moral and criminal responsibility of the corporation. They argue that 
because the corporation is entirely goal-directed, it is incapable of un-
derstanding acts which are wrong in and of themselves (pp. 279-80). 
Moreover, unlike a natural person, a corporation may not be pun-
ished through incarceration. Because the corporation cannot be 
treated as a person under the criminal law, the authors conclude that 
it is inappropriate to extend to it many of the legal and constitutional 
protections enjoyed by human persons, such as the right against self-
incrimination (p. 280). 
The emergence of corporate giantism poses some important legal 
and constitutional questions about the appropriate role of the corpora-
tion in the socio-economic and political structure of American society. 
Corporations and Society: Power and Responsibility is successful in its 
effort to further the debate on these issues. The book demonstrates the 
asymmetrical treatment of the "corporate person" in constitutional 
law and reveals the inordinate power and influence exercised by the 
corporate giants. While its characterization of the corporation as a 
form of private governance is controversial and possibly conclusory, 
this perspective of the corporate entity may serve to stimulate develop-
ment of appropriate limitations on corporate power. Corporations and 
Society: Power and Responsibility provides an interdisciplinary invita-
tion to reevaluate the role of the corporation in American society. The 
book presents an insightful analysis of the legal and constitutional is-
sues raised by the predominance of corporate capitalism and is well 
worth reading. 
- Sara Anne Engle 
tion of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 942-43 
(1952) 
[A corporation should be] subject to constitutional limitations which limit action as is the 
state itself [limited] ...• The preconditions of application are two: the undeniable fact that 
the corporation was created by the state and the existence of sufficient economic power 
concentrated in this vehicle to invade the constitutional right of an individual to a material 
degree. 
